In this article, we contend that many of the problems delineated in this special journal issue on positive psychology stem from an unexamined philosophical premise -its ontology. The world of -ontology‖ is vast and somewhat ill-defined, but here we mean simply assumptions of what is ultimately real and fundamental, especially regarding the self. We first clarify and compare two major ontologies of the self, one that we argue underlies and spawns problems for positive psychology and one that we will describe as a promising alternative for the project of positive psychology. We focus on three important features of this project: 1) commitment to an ideal of the -disinterested observer;‖ 2) emotional satisfaction as a key conception; and 3) the tendency to view human phenomena as decontextualized from culture, history, and even physical situations. These features will display both how one set of ontological premises has underlain mainstream positive psychology and how the alternative offers a fresh perspective that addresses many issues within the field.
A relational ontology also does not presume the unchangeableness of objects across time.
If the hammer really can be different from context to context, then there is sense in which the hammer literally changes from context to context -from a nail-driver to paper weight to art object, etc. There can be similarities as well (e.g., the shape and weight of the hammer), but the relationist views the abstractionist as elevating similarity over difference, and thus not taking into proper account the whole or totality of relations -both similarities and differences -in what is real and fundamental. Consequently, abstracted understandings of truth, ethical principles, or personal identity put undue emphasis on qualities of similarity. This emphasis makes truths and principles appear unchangeable or universal across their many applications, when in practice there are many important differences between them that are overlooked. In ethical practice, for example, there are situations in which we should definitely steal the bread (e.g., the play, Les Miserables) and situations in which, just as definitely, we should not.
Issues and Clarifications
Three bones of contention typically arise in debating the merits of these two broad ontologies: the specter of relativism, the role of these ontologies in the natural sciences, and the import of abstractions and relations for both views.
Relativism. First of all, a relational ontology is often thought to involve a harmful kind of relativism. For example, it might seem that there is nothing to prevent us from claiming that dishonesty or theft is good in any situation where someone or some social group defines it that way. Relativism, as we mean it here, is the notion that there simply is no Truth (with a capital -T‖) across contexts. Relativism manifests itself in a number of ways, perhaps not always appealing or admirable, in our popular culture--to each his own,‖ -different strokes for different folks,‖ and -whatever floats your boat.‖ It is true that a relational ontology assumes that all things, people, and events are the most real and the best understood in relation to their contexts. However, this relationality does not mean that there cannot be truths across contexts, or that there cannot be, as it were, a wider Context of contexts of some sort (Slife, 1999) . The main issue is that many people conceive of truth in terms of similarity and unchangeableness exclusively, whereas the relationist insists that our general understanding of what it means for something to be right or good must also make potential differences of contexts necessary to the reality of goodness or rightness in human life (Clegg & Slife, in press ). For example, a difference in context could make it very wrong to adopt a rigid abstractionist truth and never steal the bread.
The relationist, in this sense, is not a relativist because the truth (or Truth) can still be preserved; it is just a truth that includes contextual uniquenesses and differences as well as contextual commonalities and similarities. Indeed, relativism could be a high-level abstractionist principle to the effect that -all moral values are strictly relative to the opinion of one or another social group‖ (e.g., social constructionism, Gergen, 1994) . In this sense, relativism is itself grounded in a nonrelative principle. Such a claim could only be made from a -god's-eye‖ or absolute viewpoint that is itself abstracted from all contexts, and thus denied to any ordinary humans from a relational perspective (Richardson and Christopher, 1993) .
Natural Sciences. Another issue between these two ontologies involves their role in the natural sciences. Some may view modern science as exclusively concerned with abstracted -truths‖ or abstracted -objects,‖ especially as they focus on physical laws and models of the natural world (cf. Dupre', 1993; Griffin, 2000) . The law of gravity, for instance, is often considered to be the same regardless of the situation in which we encounter gravitational phenomena. To be sure, many natural scientists adopt a strictly objectifying stance toward things, according to which we abstract objects away from -subject-related qualities,‖ such as the meanings and relationships of ordinary experience that are concerned with our shifting desires, values, and aims (Taylor, 1989, p. 31) .
For a long time, this fruitful kind of objectification in the natural sciences seemed to require an abstractionist ontology. However, that is no longer the case. Today, Einsteinian relativity theory, Bohrian quantum mechanics, and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle -to name just a few -all assume that to know the -object‖ of inquiry requires understanding the context of the knower. Even within the objectifying viewpoints of natural science, not only is an abstractionist ontology misleading at times but a relational ontology is often required to successfully explain events.
Abstractions and Relations.
A third issue concerns whether or not each type of ontology recognizes the significance of both abstractions and relations. It is important to appreciate that both of them do, in their own way. In other words, abstractionism, even in its strongest and most extreme sense, still recognizes that the objects of reality interact and relate to one another in a myriad of consequential ways. However, these objects are first and foremost self-contained and independent of one another, with their qualities and properties supposedly inherent within them.
Only later and secondarily do they interact with other objects. Moreover, objects are not essentially changed by these interactions. Combinations of objects may provide a new synergy that is not available from the elements of the combination alone, but the elements are thought to remain essentially the same in the combination (e.g., the Periodic Table of Elements). The abstract is still the basic unit of reality, with the synergy having significance but ultimately being derived from the abstract.
(2001), Polkinghorne (2004), and Schön (1987) propose a striking reversal of our conventional (abstractionist) wisdom in this regard. They contend that truly proficient human performancesfrom skillful parenting to effective leadership to the practice of psychotherapy -are not guided by the kind of rule-based rationality that relies on abstract, universal principles or theories to tell us what to do in relevant particular situations. Rather, the best performances within a given area require a qualitatively different expertise based on intuition, experience, and judgment…Intuition is the ability to draw directly on one's own experience-bodily, emotional, intellectual-and to recognize similarities between these experiences and new situations…Existing research provides no evidence that intuition and judgment can be externalized into rules and explanations, which, if followed, lead to the same result as intuitive behavior. (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 21) .
Thus, relational ontologists do not deny the significance of truth propositions or ethical codesor theory in general -but they do view them as secondary to more basic realities that are ultimately and inextricably contextual, including the context of our bodies, histories, experiences, physical situations, and even communities and cultures.
What separates one ontology from another, then, is not the existence or even importance of abstractions or relationships, but rather what each ontology assumes to be the more fundamental and real. Abstractionists consider abstractions to be the more fundamental and real, whereas relationists consider relations to be the more fundamental and real. This prioritizing does not keep either type of ontology from acknowledging the significance of abstractions and relations. It just means that relations for the abstractionist have little ultimate (ontological) status, derived as they are from abstractions such as decontextualized and reified objects, whereas abstractions for the relationist are derived from concrete relations such as practices. The philosopher Gilbert Ryle once caught some of the spirit of this the latter view with his observation in The Concept of Mind, -Intelligent practice is not a step-child of theory. On the contrary theorising is one practice amongst others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted.‖
Implications for Positive Psychology
This rather thin rendition of these two ontologies begs for thicker exemplification.
Critical analyses of positive psychology, such as this special journal issue, provide an excellent way to illustrate the practical implications of these divergent philosophical outlooks. We will not tread the same ground as the other articles of this special issue. However, we will build on some of their conclusions in describing the ontological problems and alternatives of positive psychology. As we mentioned at the outset, there is a sense in which the current project of positive psychology is an exemplar of an abstractionist approach. To borrow a phrase from Isaac Prilleltensky (1989), we feel that positive psychology runs the danger of -perpetuating the status quo‖ of an abstractive outlook in psychology (see Christopher, 2003) .
We will try to make this case by identifying what we take to be three problematic features of the positive psychology program: 1) commitment to an ideal of the -disinterested observer;‖ 2) emotional satisfaction as a key conception; and 3) the tendency to view human phenomena as decontextualized from culture, history, and even physical situations. We attempt to identify the abstractionist roots of these problematic features and briefly explore how a relatively unexplored, alternative ontology of strong relationality might better serve the best aims of positive psychology.
The Disinterested Observer.
As Christopher and Hickinbottom (this issue) argue, one of the primary assumptions of many positive psychologists, taken from psychology more generally, is the notion of the -disinterested observer‖ (p. 3). Richard Bernstein (1983) characterizes this outlook as the inevitable result of an abstractionist approach to social inquiry. Indeed, it represents the favored epistemological stance of many Western social scientists, one that reflects a particular cultural perspective -the Western atomistic and interiorized self (Christopher and Hickinbottom, this issue) . This view presumes that the human agent or self is a highly individualized, abstracted, and detached observer of a world that is taking place quite separately from the observer and her observations. This approach is -disinterested‖ because it denies that it incorporates any particular cultural aims or moral values while writing its own particular cultural biases into the nature of things.
Dualism. One such cultural bias, the ideal of the disinterested observer, presupposes what is known as dualism. According to dualism, the subjective and the objective realms of being are sharply distinguished, with the subjective realm containing values, opinions, feelings, and beliefs that occur independently of the objective realm of all events outside the observer's skin (the natural world). Because values are thought to reside solely in the subjective realm, there is nothing in the objective realm that is inherently more valuable or meaningful than anything else. Hence, disinterested observers can value or deem meaningful whatever they choose in the objective realm. As Christopher and Hickinbottom (this issue) put this positive psychology perspective on values, -meaning and value are made, not discovered‖ (in the world beyond the self) (p. 8).
This abstracting of the subjective and objective realms (from one another) goes hand in glove with a highly individualistic conception of a person as a -bounded, masterful self‖ (Cushman, 1990, p. 600) . Taylor (1995, p. 7) argues that this notion of the self is as much a moral ideal as an epistemological stance. It "connects with...central moral and spiritual ideas of the modern age" such as the modern ideal of "freedom as self-autonomy...to be self-responsible, to rely on one's [own] judgment, to find one's purpose in oneself." This abstracted subjectivity is, by definition, ontologically independent of the surrounding environment. This independence does not mean that the -disinterested observer‖ could survive without the environment, but it does mean that this self is real and essentially understandable apart from the specifics of the particular situation in which it finds itself. This self-contained conception of the individual also implies that the self is relatively consistent across situations. Subjectivity can incorporate cultural and social elements of its environment, but once incorporated they too would exist essentially independently of the immediate environment, allowing the self to be quite stable across time and place. -Personality‖ or -integrity‖ in this abstractionist sense implies an essential stability and unchangeability across contexts. Interestingly, Sandel argues that a key feature of this moral outlook is the notion of a -liberal‖ or -unencumbered‖ self, the ideal of an abstracted self that is subject to no attachments or obligations it has not itself authored or chosen (excepting only an obligation to respect the independence and rights of others). Sandel goes on to strike a distinctly relationist or contextualist note with his observation that this ideal of personhood fails to make sense of many of our most cherished connections and commitments to others, communities, or traditions.
Indeed, instead of individuals defining the good life for themselves, he makes the relationist case that these connections and commitments define many of our deepest feelings and much of our very identity, even if they often call for critical examination and revision.
In his influential book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, the philosopher Bernard
Williams (1985, p. 129) seems to agree with Sandel on this point. Everyday relationships and commitments are -thick ethical concepts‖ that make sense of our deepest evaluative commitments, the judgments we regularly make of another's actions and the aspirations we have for being a certain kind of person. This vocabulary of assessment and aspiration gains its meaning from its place in the dense weave of practices and forms of life that makes up our shared background of understanding as agents in the world. Generally, people who have been raised in a particular culture are adept at understanding how to apply these thick ethical concepts in appropriate ways, even though they shift and evolve in meaning, depending on context. We often take them for granted, which is why we say they make up a shared background of intelligibility. In this view, our justification for particular judgments or actions is that they serve as constituents of the sort of complete or overall life we are realizing in all that we do.
Instrumental Ethics. When we abstract individuals out of such moral and cultural entanglements, it becomes difficult to make full sense of thick ethical concepts, even if they continue to play an important role in our lives. The only way left to explain or justify such moral values seems to be not as attitudes or actions essential to being a person, but as instruments or means to the end of reaching some set of goods, results, or payoffs-prominent examples being physical health, longer life, subjective feelings of well-being, personal autonomy, or purely self- This kind of instrumental justification of ethical ideals is a morally serious approach that intends to advance individual autonomy and well-being while preserving a moral focus needed for sustaining our sincere commitment to advancing human welfare. However, in our view, it just will not work. Procuring such results or satisfactions is simply not what we mean by many of our core commitments in their original context. These commitments represent components of what we or our community take to be the good or right life even if adhering to them entails considerable effort, sacrifice, or dis-ease. Without such commitments involving the possibility of sacrifice, it becomes very hard to make sense of someone dying for the liberty of future generations, as many great souls have done. It also turns into virtual nonsense the notion of -losing one's life in order to find it‖ that appears in different forms in most spiritual traditions.
A Relational Alternative.
Relational Self. An abstractionist ontology is inspired by the idea of a self that has a pristine core beyond cultural definition and thereby can direct a person's living and choices in an authentic manner. A relational ontology, however, -dispenses with the pre-formed ‗individual in the state of nature' of early modern political theory as well as the independent ego or ‗real self' of much 20th century personality and psychotherapy theory‖ (Richardson, Rogers, and McCarroll, 1998, p. 508) Although each particular lived experience is unique in its qualities, these unique qualities are a nexus of the experience's relation to the whole, including the experienced past…In this sense, the nexus is rich and thick with contextual and historical relations, and subjectivity and objectivity are inextricably intertwined as interpreted reality (meaning). (Slife, 2005, p. 166) Engaged Agency. On this account, the -disinterested observer‖ of an abstractionist ontology is replaced with what relationists Taylor (1993) and MacMurray (1999) would term -engaged agency.‖ Rather than a subjective, self-defining self that largely creates its own worldly meanings, the relational self is born into a waiting and already developed world that it must adopt to thrive and survive. Thus, our cultural meanings and moral values are not merely projections or constructions of individual subjectivities but substantial parts of the world itself.
This dependence on the world (and the world's dependence on the self) means that the two cannot be completely separated.
What makes some people uncomfortable with the engaged agency of a relational view is that it seems to encourage individuals to harbor commitments or a sense of identity that strongly risk compromising personal autonomy or individual responsibility. For two main reasons, the relationist thinker sees it differently. First, our contemporary conceptions of individual separateness and autonomy are partly illusory and distorted. There is no such thing as a largely self-defining individual (or even self-defining culture) who first -internalizes‖ possibilities and values from the surrounding world and then evaluates and disposes of them at will (Bishop, 2005; Yanchar, 2005) . Rather, the -self arises within conversation‖ (Taylor, 1991, p. 312) .
Indeed, the self is part of a scene or locus of dialogue among various commitments, identifications, and points of view about what is the overall good or right kind of life for humans (Bakhtin, 1981; Richardson, et al., 1998) . Long before a person takes a stand on one side or another of an issue, he or she has been deeply socialized in terms of what questions, assumptions, or dimensions of meaning are important and define those issues.
2 Those assumptions and meanings inter-define us and link us together in profound ways.
We can (and often should) allow them to be called into question, leading to a shift in our goals and directions in of living. But we can never question or stand apart from all such assumptions at once, in what could only be a bewildering vacuum. Rather, we must take for granted many of them as a basis for any questioning or critique when that seems needed.
Psychologists (positive or otherwise) who adopt an abstractionist ontology may believe that they are enlightening us as to the nature of the -true‖ or -real‖ self and at the same time advancing human welfare. But from a relational perspective, it looks like they are surreptitiously promoting a particular, highly individualistic vision of the good or best life. This vision is hardly the last word on the subject and begs to be put into critical interchange with other possibilities and insights.
A second reason for believing that an engaged agency does not mean the loss of individuality and responsibility concerns the relational nature of moral argument and justification. A relationist view offers substantive rather than merely instrumental justifications for individual actions and ideals. Substantive justifications appeal to our reigning convictions about character, community, and the good life, actions that reflect the best sort of courageous, compassionate, or spiritually enlightened kind of life as we understand it. For example, we hope 2 In a liberal democracy many matters are decided by majority rule, with the majority obtaining the right to set policy or wield authority, while in a Quaker meeting or traditional Japanese village key matters are decided by persisting in reflection, conversation, or prayer until a full consensus is reached. These are very different worlds of meaning and practice. human rights and dignity in particular contexts will vary to some extent, depending on these philosophical premises. Also, the reasons we give and the motivations we encourage for adhering to these ideals will vary as well. Our conceptions of human rights and dignity will overlap to a significant extent, we believe, but the perceived nature of the common ground or the overlap itself will vary from community to community. This objectivity fits our perhaps ineradicable sense of these values as something authoritative that stands over against us and commands our respect, obedience, or even awe. Nevertheless, to a modern sensibility, this seemingly -absolutist‖ approach seems to make final or dogmatic claims about ethical insight that seems presumptuous or serves as a convenient rationalization for selfish interests.
Instead, we might locate such values and ideals in the purely inward or subjective realm.
Things are good because they (subjectively) -feel‖ good or result in happiness. This approach might seem like a safe retreat from dogmatism, but it presents great difficulties, as a few positive psychologists have acknowledged (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999) . It represents a kind of decisionism or self-defining of the good life that flies in the face of what most of us mean when we talk about moral values. We assent to moral values because they seem intrinsically good or have some genuine authority for us, including the authority-until further reflection leads us to modify them in some way-to define our direction or ends in living Moreover, as we suggested earlier, such a subjectivist or relativist approach is surreptitiously animated by values commitments that it takes quite seriously, indeed, at least some version of our familiar modern commitment to advancing individual freedom and rights.
The psychologist and social theorist Jerome Frank (1978, pp. 5-7) recognized this turn to subjective feelings in psychotherapy generally: "institutions of American society, all psychotherapies...share a value system that accords primacy to individual self-fulfillment,"
including "maximum self-awareness, unlimited access to one's own feelings, increased autonomy and creativity." The individual is seen as "the center of his moral universe, and concern for others is believed to follow from his own self-realization." However, Frank notes, the implicit value system of modern psychotherapy "can easily become a source of misery in itself" because of its unrealistic expectations for personal happiness and the burden of resentment it imposes when inevitable disappointments occur. In his opinion, the literature of psychotherapy gives little attention to such traditional, possibly worthwhile values or virtues as "the redemptive power of suffering, acceptance of one's lot in life, adherence to tradition, self-restraint and moderation.‖ "Objective" Gut Feelings. Positive psychologists seem to deal with the abstractionist's either-or dilemma by attempting to combine aspects of both realms, objective and subjective, in determining values and ideals. Perhaps most prominently, their more sophisticated theorists have suggested that the most deeply subjective aspects of human life have a powerfully objective reality or force for us. For example, Csikszentmihalyi (1999) contends:
Emotions are in some sense the most subjective elements of consciousness . . . . Yet an emotion is also the most objective content of the mind, because the -gut feeling‖ we experience when we are in love, or ashamed, or scared, or happy, is generally more real
to us than what we observe in the world outside, or whatever we learn from science or logic. (italics added, p. 17).
The -objective content‖ of such gut feelings is the reason emotional satisfaction is so highly prized in positive psychology. These feelings are the indicators of such satisfaction. But there are many problems that afflict this picture of human striving, with a few standing out in bold relief. Are we compelled or determined to pursue the gut feelings of pleasure or emotional satisfaction that happen to arise within us? That hardly seems consistent with the positive psychologist's wish to portray us as actively and creatively achieving a more meaningful life.
Even if we are led willy-nilly in that direction, why is that good rather than a morally indifferent natural inclination, like water running downhill? If we have any freedom to choose for or against these inclinations, it is unclear what grounds there are for choosing against sadism, masochism, or nihilism, as Seligman acknowledges in the quote above. Once objectivity and subjectivity are abstracted away from one another, it appears that sheer objectivity overrides or oppresses us and sheer subjectivity sinks us into a disorienting relativism. Trying to blend these opposites, as positive psychology seems to do, only compounds the problem.
Quality of Desire?
In any context of living, humans have always already taken some stand on their lives by seizing on certain roles, traits, and values. Indeed, they "just are the stands they take in living out their lives" (Guignon & Pereboom, 1995 , p. 189). Taylor (1985a develops this notion of care with the idea that humans do not simply desire particular outcomes or satisfactions in living. Rather, they make also "strong evaluations" of their desires (Taylor, positive psychologists are bound to treat questions of the good life as a kind of public vote, discerned through research studies. Thus, they view their job as descriptive rather than prescriptive, taking no account of the disguised ideology that leads them to adopt an abstractionist view in the first place and to regard their remarkably biased account of the human struggle as entirely natural and neutral. 
A Relational Alternative
Strong Relationality 30
An ontological relationality, by contrast, assumes that the most fundamental and real entities of the world are the contextually situated aspects of our experiences, practices, and actions. In this view, the subjective cannot be divorced from the objective, and our histories, culture, and physical surroundings have to be taken into account when deliberating about a flourishing life or its qualities. This is not to say that ethical principles and value systems are unimportant or do not play a crucial role in human affairs. Rather, it is to claim that these abstractions must be validly derived from and always related to the concrete particulars of the contexts in which they occur. The most abstruse -theory‖ from this perspective, is ultimately a -form of practice‖ (Taylor, 1993; Richardson & Christopher, 1993) This contextuality implies a fresh perspective on all three aspects (described above) of a contextless understanding of the good or a flourishing life: focusing on objectivities, overlooking the situated nature of cultural and moral values, and viewing sameness as the core of community.
Interpreted Realities. To begin, do positive psychologists deal only with empirical objectivities? All -data,‖ including the data of positive psychology and the data of everyday experience, require active, though not always conscious, interpretation to be meaningful. In this sense, the relationist assumes that the subjective and objective -worlds‖ are inextricably intertwined. One way of putting this is that all people, including positive psychologists, experience interpreted realities or meanings rather than objective realities or objects. Empirical descriptions, in this sense, always have the describer's interpretive framework mixed in. To understand any description fully is to discern its inescapable moral coloring or thrust, its more or The Dignity of Difference. The third feature of a contextless understanding of the good life concerned the formation and development of human relationships and a sense of community.
In a relational view, the main focus of community -that which brings about social bonds and interpersonal connectedness -cannot be common abstractions, such as beliefs, values, and explicit philosophical outlooks. A relational approach, by contrast, relies upon the realness of relationships themselves. If others constitute us primordially, as a relational ontology implies, then we do not have to build or derive relationships from anything else, including abstractions.
We are not first and fundamentally separated from one another, needing to find something (e.g., a shared belief or value) to connect us. We are first and fundamentally related to one another in our most basic identities and roles. Thus MacMurray (1999) argues, we are dependent upon others from birth and continue to be until death, even though our individualistic culture has led some of us to think that this dependence mysteriously ends after childhood.
In this sense then, a relational ontology implies a radically different perspective on the good life. First, it means that even the best individual virtues and character strengths are shared goods and relational values, such as love, friendship, forgiveness, and sacrifice. Second, it denies an exclusive or heavy dependence on abstracted sameness for connectedness. In this view, difference, indeed the dignity of difference, is as important to understanding relatedness as sameness, something that applies as much to the search for understanding and truth in social inquiry as in everyday life. To love only those aspects of the other that resemble us is, ultimately, to love mainly ourselves. Likewise, to relate only to those aspects of the other that resemble us is barely to relate at all. Thus, the differences, conflicts, and -messiness‖ of human relationships are inseparable from their richness and rewards. We suspect that a deep acceptance of that fact, a fact not encouraged or developed by positive psychology, would contribute to achieving greater reconciliation and peace in the human struggle.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we suggest that the main question facing positive psychology (and much of social science today) concerns the issue we have termed -disguised ideology.‖ Are these theorists and researchers willing to acknowledge their own situatedness in history and culture, their own inescapable and self-defining ethical commitments, and their responsibility to engage in open dialogue with others of a different mind, here and around the world? Or will they continue, at least in part, to hide those commitments behind a pretense of value-neutrality and the bluster of -scientific validation?‖ To continue to hide these commitments, we believe, will perpetuate a significant amount of the dogmatism, elitism, cultural blindness, and pseudo-science that positive psychologists are themselves rightly concerned about but have not successfully escaped.
